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‘‘Usually, the naive interpretation of genetic data is misleading because of
the subtleties involved in the processes generating the data.That is why
it is worth thinking about mathematically.’’ Peter Donnelly, Statistics,
University of Oxford (Donnelly, 2003)
There is only one area of biology that uses mathematical statistics
not so much as a way of testing whether a given dataset is ‘‘true’’
or not, but as a way of trying to model how the natural world
works. The area is of course genetics, or to give it its historical,
and more meaningful name, experimental evolution. In evolu-
tionary genetics, probability is the mode of thinking about the
natural world, not something tacked on at the end of a study to
decide whether to accept or reject some arbitrary null hypothesis.
The latter we leave to ‘‘trialists’’.
That much statistics and genetics are cognate is re£ected by the
fact that the same names crop up in both disciplines: Fisher, Pear-
son andWright. To be a geneticist in the ¢rst third of the twen-
tieth century meant you worked with equations, albeit often
those at a fairly straightforward mathematical level. JBS Haldane’s
quip about how many cousins he would give his life for re£ected
an extraordinarily powerful way of thinking about genes, before
Watson and Crick changed the way much of biology was done.
If cloning kits replaced calculators for much of the latter third,
of the twentieth century, statistics and probability has begun to
reassert its importance as we enter the new century. And the cen-
trality of numerical reasoning and probability ¢nds its expression
in di¡erent parts of biomedicine, from proteomics through to ge-
netic epidemiology, but always in an attempt to answer the ques-
tion: what does the data show; does this constitute good evidence
in favor of or against some view of how the natural world works?
(Royall, 1997) Is what I am seeing a re£ection of mechanism or
regularity in the natural world, or is it a mere snapshot of players
moving under the in£uence of chance?
The paper by Shen and colleagues in this issue of the Journal
brings many of these issues to the fore. It is a genetic case-control,
or association study of p53 alleles in patients with melanoma.
Genetic association studies have become one of the commonest
forms of experimental design in the medical literature and
remain perhaps some of the hardest to interpret.
The experimental question addressed by Shen is whether per-
sons who develop melanoma are more likely to carry a certain
p53 allele than those persons who do not develop melanoma. If
such an association exists then there are two classes of follow-up
questions. First, those concerned with mechanism. Could this as-
sociation shed light on causal pathways; is the p53 pathway an
important one; does the study reveal anything unexpected me-
chanistically and could this pathway be a target for therapeutic
intervention? Alternatively, irrespective of mechanism, could we
use this association as a basis for predicting who might develop
melanoma? Could it provide the basis for screening or risk strati-
¢cation?
So what do Shen and colleagues say?
The paper is couched in statistical terms. They ¢nd that indivi-
duals with melanoma are more likely than control subjects to har-
bour particular p53 alleles. The di¡erences are extremely modest,
with an odds ratio of 1.43 for those carrying the Arg/Arg geno-
type, with 96% con¢dence limits just excluding 1, of 1.02^2.02.
They ¢nd that in older patients and in those, with higher Fitzpa-
trick scores the association appears stronger with odds ratios of
2.32 and 1.69. The results can be expressed di¡erently: the fre-
quency of the p53 Arg allele was 78% in cases and 73% of con-
trols, and the genotype frequencies of p53 Arg/Arg, Arg/Pro, and
Pro/Pro were 63%, 31%, and 6%, respectively, in cases, and 54%,
39%, and 7% in controls. How do we interpret this?
First, the di¡erences, at least by the standards that most biolo-
gists would use in the laboratory, are small. If one found di¡er-
ences in this magnitude in RT-PCR experiments or RNA
expression using arrays one would not get too excited. So, even
if we can exclude chance or bias as an explanation, then the data
provide little convincing evidence for thinking this is a major
mechanism for explaining variation in melanoma incidence.
Nor, with rates this small, is it going to provide anything useful
in terms of prediction before patients get to the clinic: persona-
lized medicine won’t get very far with these sorts of numbers,
although this may not diminish the enthusiasm of many. Note,
however, that none of this implies that attacking this pathway
may not be therapeutically useful in melanoma, nor that this
pathway may not be important. All we learn is that we can’t use
this study to explain much variability in the population.That hu-
mans show little variability in leg number doesn’t mean that legs
don’t serve a key biological function (Rees, 2002; Ha and Rees,
2000).
However, to interpret the data as evidence requires a little
more than a cursory look at p-values. John Maynard Keynes is
quoted as saying that ‘‘all probability is conditional’’, a phrase that
in this context simply means you can’t interpret the data as evi-
dence without saying why you did the experiment in the ¢rst
place. Are the results plausible in the light of what you knew?
Here there are no p-values to guide, and a word that some try to
banish from medical science comes into play: judgment. The
authors cite appropriately other data pertaining to their work, in-
cluding changes in p53 expression in melanomas, mutations of
p53 in melanoma, and an apparent relation between p53 and
phototype expressed as the minimal erythema dose. And what
this experiment provides is data to add to this prior view.
If you were enthusiastic about this line of enquiry before, perhaps
the data will keep you interested. If you were sceptical, you will
see little to make you change your view; you certainly won’t part
with your money to invest in start-ups based on this data alone.
There is one ¢nal caveat to add, one that links with my intro-
duction about the history of genetics and the history of our spe-
cies itself. In considering how to compare allelic frequencies,
there is an understandable tendency to somehow think of a
static comparison: just dig out the Chi2 test from a handy statis-
tical package and out falls truth.
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JBS Haldane’s critic, Ernst Mayr, used the term ‘‘beanbag ge-
netics’’ to refer to the conceptualization of genetics as a bag full
of colored beans, with di¡erent colors representing di¡erent al-
leles (Haldane, 1964). This picture is not far from the classical
model of probability, after Bernoulli, in which we imagine an
urn with a ¢xed proportion of two types of balls; what variation
will you see on repeated sampling from the urn? His theorem
says that in the long run the observed frequencies would stabilize
around the ‘‘true’’ underlying value. In reality, however, assessing
allele frequencies has to take account of the history of human
genes. The experiment is not a static one, but one in which
population history, with expansions, contractions, and other fac-
tors, plays a major role. That p53 alleles are di¡erently represented
across the worldas a result of human historywarns us that
when we sample populations and partition them according to
p53 status we are in e¡ect classifying on the basis of genetic ances-
try and not just p53 status.
In the present experiment and those reported by others, at-
tempts are made to negate this in£uence by the use of other mea-
sures such as skin type, but it is unclear what degree of
population strati¢cation remains. It is this fact, perhaps more than
any other, that means that judging the results of association stu-
dies is problematic. In general, results from association studies
have been less secure than those based on mapping. The p-values
don’t provide a marker of truth, and judgment and local knowl-
edge of the biological terrain are critical. The authors are right to
ask for a zone of tolerance around their ¢ndings, and to ask for
the most appropriate statistical test, namely whether the results
can be con¢rmed in future studies.
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